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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
It is the purpose of this paper to survey the change
that the French military security policy underwent during
the years of Charles de Gaulle's presidency.

In the years

between 1958 and 1969 Charles de Gaulle transformed the
French military system.

With the evolution of the Force

Nucléaire Stratégique the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza
tion ceased to be the bulwark of France's security.

It

is this transformation, its reasons and the phenomena
affecting it that this paper undertakes to examine.

PATTERNS OF GOVERNMENT
Political science offers a number of approaches through
which information can be processed such that those elements
perceived as important can be focused upon.

It is through

the decision-making process, more specifically the "patterns
of government" framework posited by Samuel Beer and Adam
Ulam,^ that this paper analyzes the transformation of France's
military security policy.

Beer and Ulam view government from

^Samuel Beer and Adam Ulam, Patterns of Government
(New York: Random House, 1958), pp. 12-51.

the perspective of four patterns: political culture, power,
interests, and policy.

Although these patterns each focuses

upon a different aspect of decision-making, they are not
mutually exclusive or independent.

Each relies upon the

other patterns in a relationship analogous to that between
the various organs within a living body; all are necessary
in order to sustain the whole.
Although the pattern of policy is most appropriate
for examining France's military security policy, without
the inclusion of the other three patterns an understanding
of its policy decisions could not be obtained.

Policy is

the end-product of the "patterns of government" process.
The machinery which produces this product is found in a
nation's political culture, pattern of power, and pattern
of interests.

The following paragraphs are briefly de

voted to describing each of these patterns of government;
their more specific application with regard to the sub
stantive topic of this paper is dealt with in later chap
ters .
Political culture is the most "unique" of the patterns
of government.

It alone of the four patterns is not

identified by Beer and Ulam as a "pattern of"; this lack
of designation is symbolic of its broader scope.

If the

pattern of policy is the end-product of this process p o 
litical culture represents the "industrial plant" in which

the process takes place.

Political culture is the environ

ment of government, the fundamental limits and capabilities
of a society.

It is a composition of the shared beliefs,

attitudes and values of the individuals within a society
as they apply towards its political life.

The aggregation

of these individual beliefs, values, and attitudes can be
either direct as in the case of the small, classical d e 
mocracies or indirect through the use of groups or a demo
cratic centralist concept.

The consensus that results

from this process provides a society with the purposes
which set the scope within which governmental actions
take place.
Whereas political culture represents the foundation
and framework of the patterns of government, the patterns
of power and interests are the internal structure.

It is

through these two patterns that policy is "worked out."
The patterns of power and interests are associated with
each other in a "means-ends" relationship.

Their applica

tion is somewhat based upon the basis of group aggregation;
i.e., individuals affect policy through groups.

The pat

tern of power designates the resources or capabilities
which groups possess.

Power is distributed unequally

throughout society; groups vary, as do nations, in what
they are capable of doing.

Capability studies abound in

international relations and serve as an example of what

the pattern of power means within an individual society.
The pattern of interests acts with the pattern of power;
it represents the intensity of desire for a given course
of action.

Not all groups are concerned with or desire

the same things.

Hence, intensity of interest modifies

the power relationships.

Groups without an interest in

a subject do not enter into the process of decision
making regardless of how powerful they may be; in the same
vein groups without relative power can exert little affect
upon policy formation regardless of their interests.

Power

and interests are relative to other groups that are involved
in the specific decision-making case.
The interaction of the patterns of power and interests
result in the pattern of policy, the end-product of the
patterns of government.

The pattern of policy involves

not only what decisions have been made but what the conse
quences of those decisions are.

This is a dialectic pro

cess whereby a new policy does not remain

isolated but

introduces new demands or inputs upon the political struc
ture.

A change in policy is a change in a society's e n 

vironment and leads to further changes.

The pattern of

policy is the culmination of a specific series of inter
actions within the polity that is grouped under the label
"patterns of government."

WORLD VIEW
Events of interest to political scientists do not take
place in vacuums; they occur within a world in which many,
many other events are transpiring.

The patterns of govern

ment approach (and the decision-making process itself)
focuses upon one event within this whole multi-event occur
rence.

It is therefore necessary to relate the specific

event being examined within a "world view" perspective.
This is essentially a justification for the importance of
the matter under study.

While dealing only with the mili

tary security policy of France, it can be related to the
"whole" in general terms of national security.

The follow

ing paragraphs are devoted to providing perspective for
military security policy and are derived from a presenta
tion (there are methods of relating these relationships
other than the one presented here) originated by Kenneth
2
Thompson and Roy Macridis.
Society exists in order for its members to enjoy the
economic benefits or material security that the world
affords them*, the state, as an instrument of society, exists
primarily to protect that material security.

The modern

state recognizes this function as a major factor in its
raison d 'être.
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The protection and enhancement of material

Roy Macridis, ed., Foreign Policy in World Politics
(4th ed.; Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,
1972), pp. 4-21.

security by government has grown with the expansion of
government in what is perhaps a causual relation.
The real world is composed neither of independent
individuals nor of a world state.

The nation-state

system represents the instrument by which material se
curity is dealt with.

It also introduces a number of sui

generis parameters that have to be dealt with, too.

While

Other governmental instruments could perhaps avoid these
"problems," they would each give rise to others particular
to each.

These debates over governmental systems are the

subject of political theory and lie outside the scope of
this paper.

Today, the nation-state system dominates

the real world and is what is "pertinent."

Military se

curity is a parameter of the nation-state system.

As

groups within a society are unequal in power, so are
nations in the world.

Decision-making processes recog

nize that the clash of groups
interests)

(patterns of power and

is a permanent condition.

Since the nation

state system is another group system, conflict can be
viewed as permanent.
violent.

Of course, conflict need not be

Military security represents both a concept

for violence and the prevention of violence (deterrence
strategy).
States that are "better off" may fear other states
or desire more; i.e., further better themselves and

perceive an advantage in resorting to violence.

Pre

emptive wars and imperialism have roots that lie in a
nat i on ’s material security.

Economic determinism may not

be the only motivation for a state’s actions; but as long
as material security is a primary function of a govern
ment,

it must be of major significance.

However, the

violent uses of military security are seen as becoming
less and less desirable.

As states become industrialized

or modernized, the costs of war rise prohibitively.
Deterrence strategy which can be seen within the origins
of the balance of power concept aims at preventing war.
It is interesting that this concept has been most preva
lent among the most advanced nations

(it has not always

worked for them and the consequences have been drastic);
i.e., those states that are the best off and have the most
to lose.
While material security is perceived as a domestic
concern (a perception that with growing economic interde
pendence is fading), military security is the major ele
ment of foreign policy.

Military security ("national

security" is the term used by the United States govern
ment in grouping its various military security agencies
together) is composed of what are termed as "defense
(military)" and "foreign affairs" elements.
defense ministries

Although

(formerly war ministries) represent

the capability to use force more than foreign ministries,
both place great emphasis upon their "protective mission."
A final parameter affecting the relationship between
material security and military security is the reappearance
of the former as social welfare demands.

Since the society

(and its instrument, the state) exist in order to protect
and enhance the material security of its members, these
members have a right to expect to enjoy these material bene
fits

(relabeled as "social welfare" demands).

The modern

state has been increasingly met with social welfare demands
on the part of its citizens.

Since the state has tradi

tionally handled a society’s military security requirements,
this results in the same institution openly having to fund
or foster both.

Military security and social welfare pro

grams both place demands upon the economic resources of a
state and its society.

Very few people, if any, possess

"enough" material security.

The limited resources of a

society (and the much more limited resources of the state)
are subject to demands to fulfill both functions.

Each

state must allocate its resources between these two areas.
The failure to fund adequately either (in the case of
military security this is determined when another state
"tests" its security) can be disastrous.
The balance between military security and social w e l 
fare is one of the dynamic questions of modern society and

government.

This balance determines capabilities: both those

of today and those of tomorrow ("capital investment" in social
welfare).

Hence, the consequences of policies

(and the

demands for new policies or changes in old policies) arise
within the field of this military security-social welfare
balance, and like in agriculture this year's crop provides
the seed for next year's crop.
METHODOLOGY
Military security policy which falls within the scope
of foreign policy studies lends itself readily to the util
ization of "descriptive analysis"^ or "problem analysis."^
These two methods are essentially the same, although problem
analysis is more specifically designed for foreign policy
analysis; they will be used as synonyms in this paper.

This

technique is applicable both to the categorization of inter
actions and to the delineation of important events.

It is,

of course, open to subjective conclusions, but this argument
is equally applicable to any method.

Objectivity is the

result of researchers and not of methods per s e .
Descriptive analysis is most often questioned because
it is essentially non-empirical.

While empirical research

3
Oran Young, Systems of Political Science (Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1968), pp. 5-6.
^David 0. Wilkinson, Comparative Foreign Relations :
Framework and Methods (Belmont, California: Dickenson Pub
lishing Co., 1969), pp. 138-153.
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is a useful tool, it is not universally applicable.

Foreign

policy areas do not lend themselves to empirical studies;
quantification is often impossible and when it is, often
meaningless.^

It can be valuable when used in conjunction

with other methods to enhance the "precision" of study.
Foreign policy is often made in small groups amidst great
secrecy.

The mathematical models upon which empiricism

rests require larger numbers and the greater availability
of data (which is really a requirement for any scholarly
research).

Statistical methods are designed to be employed

with groups and not with individual cases.
A second criticism of descriptive analysis is its
normative or subjective character.

The material chosen

for presentation and the weight given to it are determined
by the author.

However, this is really no different from

what is done in empirical papers.

Subjective choices and

the introduction of value judgments are inherent in any
study dependent upon human beings.
The source material utilized in this paper has been
"processed" in conformity with the methods proposed in
the previously cited "problem analysis" of David Wilkinson.

Burton M. Sapin, éd.. Contemporary American Foreign
and Military Policy (Glenview^ Illinois : Scott, Foresman
and Co., 1970), p p . 181-185.
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A combination of documents, memoirs, and scholarly (includ
ing both academic and journalistic) articles are utilized.
Because this paper focuses upon the pattern of policy,

it

draws heavily upon the available French governmental
sources.

The French government, perhaps because it was

undertaking a major change in its military security policy,
has published (both in French and English) all of the major
(by their perception) speeches, press conferences and state
ments that were issued by Charles de Gaulle and the other
important figures of the Fifth Republic.

Various journals

interested in these specific areas have also provided cover
age of the events discussed in this paper.

Since Charles de

Gaulle played a paramount role in this entire process, the
availability of his memoirs is a significant source.

How

ever, it should be noted that at the time of his death he
had not completed those portions dealing with the latter
years of his presidency; those portions completed do, how
ever, provide information on much of what he desired to do
and put into motion.
The journal articles

(including books) used have pr i

marily served the purpose of "internal criticism."^

Internal

criticism is the checking of the validity of one source by

Louis Gottshalk, Clyde Kluckholm, and Robert Angell,
The Use of Personal Documents in History, Anthropology and
Sociology (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1945) ,
p . 38.
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comparing it with other ’’independent” sources.

Since problem

analysis relies so heavily upon the use of documents, internal
criticism is an essential methodological undertaking.

Only

those sources that have met this check (a subjective judg
ment) have been used and the citations are of what is pe r
ceived to have been the prevailing attitudes within the
French government.

The journal articles serve the further

related purpose of providing ’’background” information with
regard to the events described in this paper.

SUBSTANTIVE TEXT
The following three chapters

(Chapters II-IV) are de 

voted to the analysis of the French withdrawal from NATO
and the concurrent establishment of the French nuclear
deterrent within the patterns of government framework.
While the major concern of this paper is with the change
in policy that occurred, it is necessary to understand the
underlying cultural, power and interest relationships that
enabled [or failed to prevent) Charles de Gaulle to carry
this change out.
Chapter II is devoted to the limitations placed upon
the policy-makers by France’s political culture.

It focuses

upon two areas: the search for security and its effect upon
Charles de Gaulle.

French life has been dominated by the

search for security since its defeat in the Franco-Prussian

13

War and has been re-enforced by two world wars.

This his

torical background and its effects upon French society have
resulted in a paramount concern for military security.
Charles de Gaulle was a product of this development (and,
in fact, experienced most of it).

Yet, individuals are

different even though they have been subjected to the same
socialization process.

De Gaulle’s "personal" political

culture, because of his position and strength, are of salient
interest.
Chapter III is devoted to the patterns of power and
interests.

These two categories are "collapsed" together

for the sake of convenience and better presentation.

Three

institutional "groups" are dealt with in this chapter:
the "military," the "politicians," and the "administrators."
Although most studies would not accord these groups such
"low" status

(they would be included within the decision

making machinery itself) this presentation more accurately
reflects the "true" relationships that existed.

These groups

were hardly "co-equals" with Charles de Gaulle; their in
clusion within the decision-making machinery (which is
reserved for de Gaulle in this paper) would falsely imply
greater strength and influence than they actually possessed.
Their support for announced policies could be valuable

(as

their opposition could be harmful or a hinderance), but that
did not make them partners in the actual decision-making

14

process.
Chapter IV is devoted to the change in France's mili
tary security policy.

It is a rather "detailed" account of

the reasoning and rationalization behind France's withdrawal
from NATO and its decision to rely upon its own nuclear
force (which it had to create) as the mainstay of its mi l i 
tary security policy.

The decision-making apparatus and

Charles de Gaulle are considered to be synonymous throughout
this presentation.

Also included in this chapter are the

diplomatic events that transpired within the "Atlantic Com
munity" between France and the United States.

This "con

frontation" is perhaps better described as being between
the United States and Europe because many of the French
arguments were shared (in modified form) by many of the
other European allies.
The final chapter

(Chapter V) examines the events

that have transpired since Charles de Gaulle left office
(until March, 1973) .

It focuses upon the implementation

(much of which was only in-process by 1969) of de Gaulle's
policy and the consequences that have occurred because of
the French nuclear force (with respect to NATO and France).
It examines what changes have been forced upon de Gaulle's
Successors because of the growing social welfare demands
(evident since 1968).

Because of the nature of problems-

analysis consequences, much of this chapter will contain

15

opinions as to what the future holds for France’s military
security policy.

CHAPTER II
POLITICAL CULTURE
Political culture, like a play, sets the stage and
scene upon which the roles of government and society are
played out.

A skilled and talented actor can bring much

breadth and scope to his role; another actor may play the
role so differently as to make it appear to be a quite dif
ferent character.

Both, however, are guided in their por 

trayals by the limits set forth in the script.

This chapter

attempts to outline the script that bounds French leaders
and limits their behavior.

For the most part these limits

are derived from the socialization process.

Since the

French leaders are drawn from the population of France
(admittedly in a very non-random fashion), they too share
the basic beliefs, attitudes and values that compose
France's political culture.
This chapter attempts to establish the broad outlines
of political culture with respect to military security and
to relate it to the development of individual leadership.
Specifically, one cannot write of French policy, military
or otherwise, during the 19 60 's without taking into account
the character and personality of Charles de Gaulle; the

16
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imprint of Charles de Gaulle is evident everywhere.

THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY
The French Revolution totally disrupted French society.
For over 150 years France has struggled through a restruc
turing process that is even today unfinished.

The French

people remain unintegrated politically and socially (it
is their strong cultural heritage that serves as their
bon d) .

A number of fundamental social-political issues

divide the French to such an extent that they cannot even
achieve a consensus on what form of government they desire.
More than once France has passed through the rotation of
regimes:

monarchy, republic, dictatorship, empire.

In

stability has ruled the political process because there is
no consensus around which a stable system can be constructed.
The Revolutionary Republic was threatened by the entire
might of Europe; it was against this background that Napoleon
rose to power.

The Napoleonic Era left France with a legend

that not only inspired Frenchmen but other Europeans as well.
The defeat of France by the Fourth Coalition ushered in a
new era in European diplomacy, an era of threatened military
security for France.

Previous European wars had been fought

within a classical balance of power system; realignment of
allies continually took place.

The French Revolution in

introducing ideology (nationalism; liberalism) disrupted
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this system.

No longer did states "rationally" pursue

their interests in shifting alliances.
The Fourth Coalition of victorious allies

(Great

Britain, Prussia, Russia, and Austria) were so shaken by
the Napoleonic wars that they feared to restore the old
balance of power with its "invisible hand."

In the Treaty

of Chaumont (March, 1814) the signatory powers

(the members

of the Fourth Coalition) agreed to unite in a Quadruple
Alliance for twenty years and to hold periodic conferences
to settle matters of mutual concern.

This was a victor's

coalition attempting to guarantee its victory (it perhaps
served as a precedent for the world war settlements).

The

major purpose of the Quadruple Alliance was to prevent
France from again threatening Europe, either militarily
or covertly, through its revolutionary ideas.
Franch had faced

Although

hostile alliances before, it was not

accustomed to the total isolation and helplessness that
it experienced following the fall of Napoleon.
The next fifty years were, for France, years of tor
ment.

The Napoleonic wars had drained it of strength,

and the Industrial Revolution was weakening it relative to
other powers such as Great Britain and the United States.
However, it retained its reputation as an activist military
state.

French diplomacy strived, often successfully during

the Bourbon and Orleanist monarchies, to overcome this

19

reputation and the military threat it engendered.

With

the institution of the Second Empire and another Napoleon
the suspicion and distrust with which France had been viewed
was revived.
The search for security that epitomizes modern France
originated in the collapse of the Second Empire of Louis
Napoleon as a result of his defeat in the Franco-Prussian
War.

All through the middle years of the nineteenth cen

tury France's reputation exceeded its military capabilities.
Whereas Napoleon I had been able to fight (and almost defeat)
a coalition of Europe’s mightiest nations, Napoleon III was
unable even to "make a decent showing" against what had been
the weakest member of the Fourth Coalition.

A preoccupation

with military security emerged from France's defeat at the
hands of Prussia in 1871.
The Third Republic came to life in a different world
than the Second Empire had died in.

France's borders were

no longer "empty"; Germany and Italy had come into nation
hood.

The creation of two more strong states, states that

were not necessarily friendly towards France, heightened
the feelings of threatened security.

The last decades of

the nineteenth century were years of seeking.

Driven by

the desire for revanche and the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine,
France actively sought out the allies for a future war
against Germany.

War scares appeared with unceasing regularity.

20

Otto von Bismarck was so successful in guiding German
policy between 1870 and 1890 that he was able to keep France
virtually isolated.

This enabled Europe to remain in a

state of relative peace during those years.

France, a l

though it feared for its military security, was alone too
weak to initiate a war that would have any chance of being
won.

With the "dropping of the pilot" by Wilhelm II in

1890, the French were given the chance to break out of the
isolation that Bismarck had imposed upon them.

Bismarck

had constructed a tremendous system in order to keep France
isolated.

He knew that it was from France alone that the

German state had anything to fear.

He was confident that

Germany could defeat France, but if it was allied to any
other state the outcome might differ.

By minimizing German

demands for an overseas colonial empire (he encouraged the
French aspirations in this sphere as a means of creating
conflicts between France and the other colonial powers)
and the kindred demands for a large navy, Bismarck was
able to carry on amiable relations with Great Britain.
The masterpiece of the Bismarckian system was his
Austro-Russian diplomacy.

By deftly playing the "honest

broker" and fully utilizing Germany’s capabilities to act
as a "balance," Bismarck was able to maintain alliances
with both Austria and Russia (depriving France of a poten
tial ally), whose competition for supremacy in the Balkans
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was a constant threat to the peace.
With the removal of Bismarck, the French were able to
exploit the Austro-Russian differences so successfully that
within four years they were able to end their enforced
isolation.

The Franco-Russian Alliance in 1894 greatly

enhanced France's military security.

By deftly exploiting

further German mistakes, France was able to create the
Triple Entente.

It was through the urging of France that

Great Britain and Russia, who were competing for influence
and empire in Asia, were brought together.

The Triple

Entente provided France with the security necessary in order
to pursue its policy of revanche.
The balance of power concept is predicated upon the
ability of the member states to unite together with such
a preponderance of power that the perceived potential
aggressor is deterred from his actions.

Bismarck's Germany

had performed this function with regard to Austria and
Russia between 1870 and 1890 extremely well.

The alliances

that emerged in the early years of the nineteenth century
failed in this task.

The Triple Alliance of Germany,

Austria and Italy and the Triple Entente of France, Russia
and Great Britain were too rigid and equal in strength to
perform a deterrence role upon each other.

In fact, de-

terrance (and, hence, the balance of powers) was not the
objective of France.

Although France desired protection
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from Germany, its goals of revanche and the recovery of
Alsace-Lorraine were such that they could only be achieved
through w a r .
The effects of World War I transformed France's m i l i 
tary security policy from revisionist to defensive.

Its

goals of revanche and the recovery of irredenta had been
achieved, but the costs had also been tremendous.
War I was fought mainly upon French soil.

World

Coupled with

this devastation was the great loss of life the French
suffered.

Since population is an important factor in the

future capabilities

(military and economic) of a state.

World War I greatly crippled France's future prospects.
Although France emerged from World War I among the v i c 
tors, the war had been so "close" that it was left with a
great fear of German revenge.

Since France had pursued a

similar policy following the Franco-Prussian War, French
statesmen readily credited Germany with planning to pursue
the same type of policy.
The Versailles Conference met to reorder Europe follow
ing World War I, as the Congress of Vienna had following
the Napoleonic wars.

It was here that the French attempted

to obtain a "guarantee" of protection from Germany.

At

first the French maneuvered to have Germany dismembered.
When the attempt to create a new "Confederation of the
Rhine" proved unsuccessful, France, driven by the fear of a
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united, revenge-seeking Germany, scrambled to guarantee
its security.

The terms that France had imposed upon

Germany at Versailles were so harsh that they are often
given credit for creating the spirit of revenge in Ger 
many that France had sought to avoid.
In compensation for the failure to dismember Germany
France was promised by the United States and Great Britain
a guarantee against any future German aggression.

These

alliances represented the combination of strength that had
defeated Germany in World War I and were perceived as being
capable of deterring another, but this security system
quickly evaporated.

The United States refused to ratify

the Versailles Treaty, let alone the alliance with France;
Great Britain used the excuse of the United States failure
to participate in order to renege on its pledge.

As a

result France was left without a guarantee of protection
against a Germany in which a spirit of revenge was being
fostered because of the harsh terms of the "Versailles
Dikt a t."
France had, in the nineteenth century, sought out its
security in alliances with major powers.

With the collapse

of the Versailles guarantees France was again left in
isolation, an isolation that could not be broken by the
forming of alliances with the great powers.

The United

States and Great Britain had backed out of their commit-
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meats; Russia had fallen under the control of the Bolshevists
and was an ideological outcast.

The "French Alliance System"

that grew up following World War I bound a weakened France
with the weak successor states in Eastern Europe.

France

sought protection against Germany by attempting to encircle
it as had been done before World War I; alliances were formed
with Poland and Czechoslovakia.

However, unlike its dip

lomatic success in bringing about the Anglo-Russian rapproche
ment in 1907, France was never able to smooth over the di f 
ferences that separated the Czechs and Poles.

It was this

failure which eventually proved the denouement of the French
Alliance System.
The Second World War brought France’s greatest fears
to life.

The German armies disposed of the French military

establishment with relative ease; the fall of France in
1940 was a crushing experience for the French people.

Its

military weakness rapidly set off a "chain reaction" that
brought down France's always instable political structure.
Following the Franco-Prussian War the Monarchist-dominated
Constituent Assembly established what became the Third
Republic as a temporary expedient until they could agree
upon a candidate for the throne.

This temporary compromise

continued to exist throughout the rest of the nineteenth
century and into the twentieth century.

Constantly shaken

by scandals, the Third Republic began to disintegrate follow
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ing World War I.

The new century brought an increased

emphasis upon social welfare questions
worldwide depression).

(re-enforced by the

The French government was incapable

of meeting these demands.

France combined a multi-party

system with a parliamentary structure which, however demo
cratic it may have been, failed to produce governments that
could govern.

A chronic state of immobilism developed in

the inter-war years.

Ministeries were formed by coalitions

of divergent interests agreed only on narrow, short-range
goals; major programs were too divisive to be carried out.
The governments of the inter-war years took on the character
of a continuous series of revolving caretakers.

The defeat

of 1940 has been attributed to the failure of French leader
ship (military and political).
The conclusion of World War II saw France in the same
predicament that had been its fate following World War I
(only it was worse in 1945);

it was defenseless, weak and

feared yet another German revival.

French diplomacy set

out once again on the old paths of alliance and dismember
ment.

This time it achieved a success in dismembering

Germany as that state was partitioned into "zones of occupa
tion."

France also found success in the forming of alliances

It quickly concluded agreements with Russia and an AngloFrench alliance signed at Dunkirk.

Later in 1948 the D u n 

kirk Treaty was expanded into the Brussels Pact with the
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adherence of the Benelux nations to the original agreement.
All of these diplomatic measures were designed to "control"
Germany and protect French national security.
The emergence of the Soviet threat to Europe and the
creation of NATO in order to meet that threat are dealt
with in Chapter IV because of its relationship to France's
nuclear strategy and withdrawal from NATO.

The brief pre 

sentation in the above paragraphs outlines the importance
attached to military security by the French nation.

Any

nation constantly threatened, as has been every French
generation since the French Revolution, by military inva
sion does not lightly ignore its security needs.

POLITICAL CULTURE AND CHARLES DE GAULLE
Political socialization is a "macro" concept in that
it envisions a process acting upon an entire society, but
it is well known that individuals undergo this process
differently.

The preceding section dealt with an historical

overview that affected the entire French nation; this sec
tion deals with the individual character of Charles de
Gaulle.

All societies, especially one as divergent as

France, is composed of numerous individuals whose personal
experiences impress upon them beliefs, attitudes and values
that may differ markedly from those ascriptive of political
culture.

Since individuals bring these "macro" belief
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systems with them to the roles they fulfill in public ser
vice, the personality of an individual decision-maker such
as Charles de Gaulle can be of salient interest in under
standing the actions undertaken.
Parents and family are one of the strongest elements
in the socialization process.

The de Gaulle family was

politically attuned to the Monarchist Tradition in France.
While the restoration of a king (Bourbon-Orleanist)

is a

primary desire of Monarchists, an underlying belief is
that France should be governed by a strong executive.

Many

writers have compared de Gaulle's presidency in monarchial
terms; the label of "Republican Monarchy" has often been
ascribed to it.

The Monarchist Tradition, taking its

fundamental principles

(i.e., overlooking its "kingly

trait"), has inculcated the belief in a strong executive
among those exposed to it.

In a French society that

enshrined a weak executive this background of Charles de
Gaulle helps explain his willingness to set aside the
political "norm" and to urge a strong presidency.
An appeal for a strong executive is only one example
of wherein de Gaulle differed from the "norms" of French
political culture.

Twice, in 1940 and in 1958, de Gaulle

denied the legitimacy of the "constitutional" government
of France.

This questioning of legitimacy is another

heritage of the Monarchist Tradition.

Originally rooted

28

in the belief that the "Republic” was an unlawful usurpation,
in modern times it has devolved into merely a questioning of
governmental actions.

Perhaps one can view this as an

extension of Rousseauian thought; government is only the
agency acting in behalf of the sovereign, legitimate people.
De Gaulle was born in 1890 and grew up in the preWorld War I era.

He was subject to much of the revanche

spirit that ran throughout France,

He was trained for a

military career and served in both world wars.
events cannot have left de Gaulle uneffected.

These major
During the

inter-war period de Gaulle taught at the French military
academy, Saint-Cyr.

Charles de Gaulle was one of the

foremost spokesmen for military modernization, for tactics
that were utilized by the Germans when they defeated France
in 1940.

De Gaulle had not been committed to "fighting

the last war" and was able to clearly perceive the changes
that necessitated readjustment of military security policy.
He brought this specialty with him when he returned to
power in 1958 and many of his actions can be traced to
these abilities.

CHAPTER III
THE PATTERNS OF POWER AND INTERESTS
Le system, the military, and the civil service compose
the three institutional groups most concerned with France’s
military security policy.

These groups are not only the

instruments by which France’s military security policy is
carried out, but they also are pressure groups which endeavor
to help formulate that policy.

Traditional administration

theory makes a distinction between policy and administration,
but that distinction is now recognized as an artificial
"academic” tool.

Those who carry out policies are not

opinionless, belief less

creatures.

They are highly involved

and concerned with the policies they "administer."

Only in

nations where loyalty to the "rules of the game" are so strong
(Great Britain during the labor government of 1945-1951) can
one see "little" interference with policy by those who admin
ister it.
Beer and U l a m ’s patterns of power and interests were
designed primarily to deal with pressure groups; governmental
institutions were categorized with the decision-making a p 
paratus within the pattern of policy.
of French politics

However, the realities

(and perhaps all political structures)
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miti ate against such an approach.

A group that is institu

tionally accorded recognition differs from an "ordinary"
pressure group

(which may be functionally represented in

advisory committees) only in the degree of its power.

It,

of course, is charged with the administration of the partic
ular policy, but often governments have charged private
groups with this responsibility (the broadcast media and
utilities in the United States).

A second consideration

is the relationships between these groups and Charles de
Gaulle.

Although the military did challenge de Gaulle,

for the most part he was paramount within the decision
making arena.

These relationships reflect more of a pres

sure group style than that of a co-equal partnership which
inclusion within the decision-making process would imply.
Attitudes towards pressure groups are an element of a
nat io n’s political culture.

Discussion of them has been

postponed until now in order to directly relate them to the
events described in this chapter.

From Rousseau can be

traced a political philosophy that places great distrust in
the activities of pressure groups as expressions only of
"particular wills" and not of the "general will."

This is

essentially the public interest versus private interest
argument that is fundamental in the study of pressure group
politics.

The connotations are such that the pursuance of

particular wills are viewed as in conflict with the good of
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the whole.

What occurs is that groups cloak their private

interests with the formal trappings of public interest in
another case of "vice paying tribute to virtue."
This rationalization of private interests
that they are national or public interests)

(claiming

is an important

element in the events described in this chapter.

The insta

bility of the French political structure enhanced this prob
lem in that an "authoritative" institution (i.e., an agency
that could in judge-like fashion decree what were public
interests and what were private) did not exist.

Although

these were a French government, many of France's people did
not accord it this authoritative role.

The military espe

cially questioned the government's attempt to do this and,
in fact, challenged it for supremacy.

It is this competition

for supremacy in the authoritative role (usually considered
the role of the government or state) that is the main thrust
of this chapter.

Power struggles for the control of a state

by individuals are familiar

(perhaps because of historical

methodology), but similar struggles among institutional
groups are not.

Extensive governmental institutional groups

(going beyond what political party terminology refer to as
the "cadre" stage of development to a "branch" or "mass"
structure) are a phenomenon of the modern state.
This paper deals with the three institutional groups
(le system, the military, and the civil service) as if they
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were unified.

This is obviously an academic "fiction" that

is utilized because of the convenience it affords.

Groups

are almost always divisible into sub-groups or factions that
compete with one another.

When, in the course of this paper,

the group name is used, it is as a shortened title for the
dominate faction within the group

(e.g., instead of saying

the "Revolutionary Warfare Faction within the Army portion
of the military," the term "the military" is used).

Often

the defeat of a "group" is attributable more to the combina
tion of its non-dominate factions

(in alliance with outside

"groups") than of the strength of other groups.
this is the case it is noted.

Wherever

Confusion, of course, arises

because factions within groups like groups within a society
tend to claim to represent the "general will."

^

SYSTEM
The term

system" is applied to the elected officials

who held power during the Fourth Republic.

It also includes

the functionaries or courtiers that attached themselves to
this political core.

The Fourth Republic, like the Third

Republic, was structured within a parliamentary framework.
The legislature was the center of power with the president
being a ceremonial position without much real power and the
"Government" or Ministries being responsible to the Chamber
of Deputies.

Although this framework "parallels" that in
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Great Britain, it was far more weaker in fact due to the
operation of a multi-party system within France.

The di 

versity that was described in the chapter on political
culture has lead France to develop an electoral system in
which a half dozen or more ’’major‘d political parties com
pete for legislative seats.
French voters actively supported the myriad of political
parties and were so "evenly" distributed in their support
that no one of them could ever achieve a majority as the r e 
sult of an election.

This meant that governments had to be

formed from coalitions worked out within the legislature and
were not "ready-made" as in Great Britain (the election e n 
trusting a party with a majority).

The multi-party system

further complicated this task in that the parties were often
committed to many divergent policies.

Because no party

could obtain a majority electorally (and, therefore, be ex
pected to carry out its program), "rash" and "irresponsible"
promises were often made in order to attract voters.

Once

these positions were taken, it was hard (especially in that
fiercely competitive atmosphere) to back down from them.
Since they were often made in order to distinguish the party
from parties with similar ideological beliefs, this made it
difficult for stable coalitions to be formed.

It is easy to

imagine the difficulty of coalition formation among parties
of competing ideologies.

Yet, the same process applied with
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parties that were ideologically similar
etc.).

[Left, Right, Workers,

Other cleavages often divided these parties.

The result was that the Fourth Republic was a republic
of immobilism.
problems.

Coalitions were formed to deal with specific

When new problems arose, the coalitions often d i s 

solved because the parties were in disagreement over how to
solve it.

This would necessitate a new coalition being formed

that could agree on how to solve the new problem.
turn, would come apart when another problem arose.
the

It, in
Because

coalitions were also "responsible" for the political

direction of the government, the rapid turnover resulted in
an abdication of leadership.

During the twelve years of the

Fourth Republic twenty-three premiers held office,^ (tenure
in other ministries was often of longer duration).

These

governments seldom stayed in office long enough to get a
"handle" on things and were subsequently caretaker in nature.
Another element of the immobilism that affected the
Fourth Republic was the personal ambition of many of the
politicians involved.

The multi-party legislature made it

easy for pressure groups to wield influence.

The Third

Republic (with a similar political structure) was repeatedly
rocked with scandals involving the seedy side of lobbying

^David Thomson, Democracy in France Since 1870 (London:
Oxford University Press, 1969) , p. 240.
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and influence peddling.

This reputation was carried over

into the Fourth Republic.

Whether or not it went as far as

it had during the Third Republic
Fifth Republic)

(or to the extent in the

is not that important; the major point is

that the French National Assembly because of the democratic
nature of the electoral system, was prone to represent and
respond to pressure groups.

The French deputies were also

relatively secure in their offices; this enabled them to
engage in much "politicking."

Governments were often over

thrown for no other reason than that a group of ambitious
politicians wanted to have office (or improve their position).
A cabalistic atmosphere pervaded the Fourth Republic.

Getting

into office and staying in became objectives in themselves.
Because of these reasons the Fourth Republic acquired
the opprobrium of the French people, and it was with such
connotations that the term "1^ system" was used.

The

Fourth Republic's beginning had not been propitious to
start with.

The first attempt at approving a constitution

had been defeated.

The second constitution, which passed,

received only 9,120,576 votes to 7,980,333 while 7 ,938 ,884
2
voters abstained.
The Fourth Republic began without the
confidence of a majority of the French people and its actions
did nothing to change that.

^Thomson, p.

237.
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The immobilism resulted in the other institutions of
government [technically responsible to the political govern
ment) such as the military and the civil service taking over
the direction of policy that had been abdicated by

system.

The Fourth Republic was brought to an end when one of the
political leaders attempted (actually only an implied threat)
to regain control of the decision-making process.

Although

le system was generally despised, there were "within" it
reformist factions.

system had deftly avoided the

Algerian crisis for a number of years

(actually a few

governments had collapsed over their inability to solve
it).

Actual power with concern to Algerian policy had been

allowed to flow to the military (which will be dealt with
more fully in the next section of this chapter).

In May,

1958, Pierre Pflimlin, upon becoming premier, set out to
settle the Algerian problem.

He was invested with the

premiership on May 13, 1958; the army in Algeria revolted
3
on the same day.
The French generals in control of the
Algerian policy did not favor negotiating with the Algerian
rebels because they thought this would lead to an independent
Algeria; a situation which they opposed.

Pierre Pflimlin

was willing to open negotiations with the rebels;

it was

for this reason that the revolt was staged.
3

Lowell Noonan, France : The Politics of Continuity in
Change (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), p. T i l .
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The army in Algeria

[dealt with in the next section

under the term '^Revolutionary Warfare" faction) dominated
the military establishment even though it was numerically
a minority even within the army.

It was able to achieve

its aims by "neutralizing" the other elements of coercisive
force.

It appealed to the "unity of the army."

Its success

was not as much due to the support the Revolution Warfare
doctrine held within the army as to the lack of support for
the Fourth Republic and I2

system.

Pflimlin's government discovered that the
military units in metropolitan France and
West Germany were not prepared to use force
or even demonstrations of force to bar the
insurrection from the mainland . . . . Most
units, it was feared only awaited some sign
that the rebels would succeed before they
helped to pull down the rickety political
structure.
The invasion of Corsica, publi
cized plans for paratroop drops around Paris,
and De Gaulle's announcement that he was b e 
ginning the process of forming a government
therefore provided sufficient motivation for
the Fourth Republic to commit s u i c i d e . 4
The unpopularity of ^
of an alternative

system combined with the emergence

(Charles de Gaulle)

in which to invest

France's legitimacy enabled the military to pull off its
coup d'etat.

4
Edgar Furniss, De_ Gaulle and the French Army : A
Crisis in Civil-Military Relations (New York: The Twent ie t h C e n t u r y Fund, 1964), p. 1Û4.
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The Revolutionary Warfare faction had been able to
initiate the coup d 'grâce of the Fourth Republic because
of its unpopularity.

Yet the Revolutionary Warfare faction

lacked the support itself to assume control of the govern
ment and set up a military junta.
war may have been the result.

If it had tried, a civil

For this reason it accepted

Charles de Gau ll e’s assumption of power believing that he
shared their Algerian views.
The constitution of the Fifth Republic transferred
the center of power from the National Assembly to the
presidency.

The creation of a strong presidency enabled the

Fifth Republic to survive its own confrontation with the
military three years later.

Although the elected officials

under the Fifth Republic were concerned with the issues of
foreign and defense policy (in fact, for the most part they
were the "same” individuals that had held office under the
Fourth Republic), the transference of decision-making power
to the presidency reduced the affect that they could have
upon it.
The members of the National Assembly were never able to
recover this power during Charles de Gaulle's presidency.
The reputation of ^

system clung to them.

Fears of immo

bilism and chaos were levied against them whenever they
attempted to reclaim powers.

De Gaulle identified the

National Assembly with the particular interests and deputies
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of Rousseau’s thought.

He had nothing but contempt for them

(although he was forced to put up with them) and preferred,
perhaps reflecting a combination of Rousseauian and Monarchist
Traditions, to rule through plebiscites.

He expressed this

belief in his Memoirs of Hope :
Now, while I was convinced that sovereignty
belongs to the people, provided they express
themselves directly and as a whole, I refuse
to accept that it could be parcelled out
among the different interests represented
by the parties . . . . But in order that the
State should be, as it must be, the instru
ment of French unity, of the higher interests
of the country, of continuity in national
policy, I considered it necessary for the
government to derive not from parliament,
in other words the parties, but, over and
above them, from a leader directly mandated
by the nation as a whole and empowered to
choose, to decide and to act.S
De Gaulle utilized the plebiscite throughout his presidency
to give substance to this belief.

His success in doing so

(until April, 1969) enabled him to relegate the National
Assembly (the location of ^

system) to a secondary role.

The National Assembly provided de Gaulle with support
through most of his presidency;
of opposition.

it was not a rampant center

Yet, it was within the National Assembly

that the members of the Fourth Republic’s 3^ system congregated
and where opposition did voice itself to de Gau ll e’s policies.

^Charles de Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope : Renewal and Endeavor
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 197T), p. 6.

40

THE MILITARY
The military establishment of a nation is the instrument
of its defense.

With its civil service counterpart it admin

isters the totality of government policy.

The problem that

arises is due to the fact that policy-administration dichotomy
is an academic tool for separating facts and values in issues
that are dealt with by single individuals.

Administrators

have beliefs, values, and attitudes too; they cannot be e x 
pected not to (they can be expected to place the enforcement
of legitimate directives above these personal beliefs).

When

administrators "forget" their role and ignore the legitimate
societal policy-making apparatus, a "conflict of interests"
arises.

This is what occurred with the military during the

Fourth Republic.

The military not only was the instrument

for the French Algerian policy but a major advocate of a
specific Algerian policy (continued union with France).
The French army has had a traditional role in the admin
istration of colonies.

It played a major role in the crea

tion of the French overseas empire following the FrancoPrussian War in 1871.

The military provided many of the

colonial administrators and thereby acquired a heritage
of solving political problems.

The colonial wars fought

to preserve this empire increased the importance of the
military as political administrators.^

The French army's

^Bernard Brown, "The Army and Politics in France," The
Journal of Politics, XXVI, 2 (May, 1961), p. 276.
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major mission was not combative but administrative.

This

predominance of the administrative function lead "the Army
(to acquire) psychological, paternalistic and political in7
terests in the French Empire,"
When the "winds of change"
began to sweep that empire away, the French army became more
desperate in its futile efforts to preserve what remained.
Algeria became a symbol of that empire (it was the first
area that had been conquered) at the same time as the Fourth
Republic was sinking deeper and deeper into its immobilism.
With the government’s reluctance or inability to solve the
Algerian problem the military eagerly took over direction of
policy.

The army's initial military activities were soon

superceded as the war in Algeria became more intense.

Com

mitted to the victory of its own policy, the army assumed
total control of French policy towards Algeria.
The counterpart to its efforts to predeter
mine what single policy would emerge from
the political process was the army's practice
of interpreting, even reconstructing, decisions
taken by the government so that they would
mean what supporters of French Algeria wanted
them to mean.
Favorable pieces were taken out
of context and construed to be the whole policy.
Negative elements, qualifications, nuances were
ignored.8
It was the weakness and uncertainty of the political leaders

Ronald Stupak, "The Military's Ideological Challenge
to Civilian Authority in Post-World War II France," Orbis,
XII, 2 (Summer, 1968), p. 584.
Bpurniss, p.

82.
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in Paris that made the assumption of policy-making powers
by the army in Algeria so easy.

It was because of this

weakness that the political leaders failed in their con
frontation with the military and brought on the demise of
the Fourth Republic.
The French army continued to aggregate authority to
itself.

It extended the scope of its concerns beyond the

realm of military affairs and into social and political
questions.
With the autonomy of decision and its expanded
role in Indochina as a precedent, the army
cast itself upon the Algerian people and
sought to mold them into a contented, peaceful,
prosperous society controlled by France.
So
weak were the institutions of the Fourth R e 
public, so divided the counsels of its leaders,
that the army, in its fantastic endeavor, had
come by 1958 to assume for the most part full
powers, untrammelled by civilian direction,
not responsible to political authority.9
An "ideological” content emerged within the a r m y ’s goals for
Algeria.
As has been previously mentioned, the French military
was dominated by the Revolutionary Warfare faction.

This

group of officers and enlisted men, mainly within the con
ventional combat forces of the army, subscribed to a doctrine
that coupled military strategy with social action.

^Furniss, p.

24.

The vast
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bulk o£ the French military establishment did not share these
beliefs, but because those who did occupied the key combat,
staff and training positions. Revolutionary Warfare dominated
French military thinking.

The French army underwent a dras

tic transformation following World War II.

Thrown into a

series of disasterous colonial wars, especially the one in
Indochina, many officers arrived at the conclusion that the
only way in which the French Empire could be preserved was
if the army directly assumed political p o w e r s . T h i s

doc

trine appealed greatly to the army's combat elements who
viewed their own position vis

à

vis other elements of the

military and their continued existence as dependent upon the
preservation of the French Empire.

The empire justified the

maintenance of a large conventional force.
The French defeat in Indochina was a tremendous shock,
especially for the military leaders who were confident in
their technical superiority.

The military underwent a p r o 

cess of introspection from which the Revolutionary Warfare
doctrine (so called because it was meant to be counter
revolutionary) emerged as an explanation of France's defeat.
France's military capabilities were not faulted; Revolutionary
Warfare posited that France's defeat had stemmed from political

^®Jean-Marie Domenach, "The French Army in Politics,"
Foreign Affairs, XXXIX, 2 (January, 1961), p. 187.
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factors beyond the control of the military.

Ho Chi M i n h ’s

success in Indochina was attributed to the strong appeal
that "his Marxist-Leninist ideology" had because of its social
welfare considerations.

The failure of the French government

to meet the socio-economic needs of the Indochinese peoples
provided the vehicle by which Ho Chi Minh was enabled to
ride to power.
Social action is a basic function of modern governments.
The determination of social welfare policy is a political
function and in the Western democracies is a task carried
out by the elected representatives of the people.

The Revolu

tionary Warfare faction claimed that the army should possess
this function if it was to preserve the French Empire.
Attached to the fundamental decision to assume the political
function was the ordering of specific policies by which the
social welfare demands of France's colonial people's were to
be met.

Revolutionary Warfare combined within the military's

authoritarian structure a program of socio-economic reforms
much akin to those advocated by various socialist groups.
(Yet, it was actively anti-communist politically.)
It was the Revolutionary Warfare group which lead the
army into assuming political authority in Algeria.

It was

composed not only of France's elite combat troops

(who were

fighting the war in Algeria) but of most of the "general
staff."

It was this domination of the "general staff" (and
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the military schools, such as Saint-Cyr) which enabled the
Revolutionary Warfare faction to speak authoritatively in
the name of the army and of the whole military.

Opposition

to the doctrine could be and was considered a threat to the
"unity of the army" and to the legitimate military institu
tion (and, interestingly, to the government itself).

By

imposing itself between the government and the rest of the
bulk of the military, the Revolutionary Warfare faction was
able to sever the legitimate channel of communications
connecting these two groups.

Since most of the army was

dissatisfied with 3^ system, the government was unable to
eliciate any support from them when the crisis came in
May, 1958.
The Revolutionary Warfare faction, in de facto control
of French Algerian policy, rebelled when Pierre Pflimlin
posed a challenge to their continued exercise of authority.
. . . since the Army saw itself as the em 
bodiment of the national will, it believed
that any persons or groups disagreeing with
its ideological interpretation of the national
and international scenes were necessarily
traitors or communist agents.
It felt that
it had to have power to make its voice heard
at all levels, to carry out its national d e 
fense mission, and to look after the nation's
destiny.11
It not only removed Pflimlin but the Fourth Republic as well;

^^Stupak, p.

593.
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it hoped by this means to guarantee its continued control
over Algerian policy.
Charles de Gaulle's assumption o£ power, although the
result of the coup d'etat carried out by the Revolutionary
Warfare faction,was not as a spokesman (or leader) for that
group.

De Gaulle's supporters had urged his acceptance upon

the disparate elements within the military as a means of
avoiding a civil war.

The last days of May, 1958 were filled

with the tension of crisis.

While the overthrow of the

Fourth Republic by the Revolutionary Warfare faction was
readily accepted, the attempt by that group to establish
a military junta (if it had desired to do so) would have
met with opposition.

De Gaulle, whose beliefs concerning

Algeria were in conjunction with the Revolutionary Warfare
faction's at that time, offered an alternative to chaos and
civil war.

By turning to him the impasse created by the

coup d'etat was overcome.

Charles de Gaulle, possessing

great personal prestige, could unify the various groups
behind his government.
De Gaulle represented a compromise similar to that
which had resulted in the adoption of the Third Republic;
he divided France the least.

De Gaulle assumed office

believing in a French Algeria; his experiences in office
lead him to change that viewpoint.

De Gaulle came to

accept the necessity of negotiating with the Algerian rebels
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(and, by implication, the independence of Algeria) as the
only solution to the Algerian problem.

This is precisely

the reason for which the army had overthrown the Fourth
Republic.
. . . there is little evidence that De Gaulle
deliberately set out to fight the Algerian
army which had placed him in power.
De
Gaulle’s ambiguities, shifts, and retreats
are more logically explained as reactions to
unanticipated obduragy encountered in his
dealings with both the Moslem nationalists
.2
and the military-European alliance in Algeria.
The reaction of the Revolutionary Warfare faction was shock,
As de Gaulle’s policy unfolded they turned from disbelief
and anger to opposition.
. . . it was De Gaulle’s consummate ability
to out-maneuver the army that most aroused
military anger.
The army had thought it was
installing an effective and willing prompter
of its Algerian policy.
What it got was a
President who, behind a smoke-screen of p u b 
lic contradiction and ambiguity, sidled down
the very path of "abandonment" from which the
army had barred the Fourth R e p u b l i c . 13
The Revolutionary Warfare faction proposed to settle this
problem in the same manner as it had dealt with the Fourth
Republic--by coup d ’etat.

^^Furniss, pp. 177-178.
^^Ibid., p. 69.
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The General's Revolt in 1961 was essentially a repeti
tion of the May, 1958 coup d'etat except that it failed.

The

strength of the Revolutionary Warfare faction was unable to
dispose of the Fifth Republic as it had of the Fourth Repub
lic.

The strength of the Revolutionary Warfare faction had

not changed since 1958;

it was due to "external" changes

that it failed.

Instead of opposing a weak, vacillating

Fourth Republic,

it confronted a revitalized Fifth Republic

lead by Charles de Gaulle.

The massive passitivity that

had been shown over the fate of the Fourth Republic by the
French people was no longer a condition favoring the Revolu
tionary Warfare faction.
De Gaulle, on assuming office in 1958, undertook to
"modernize" the French military;

it is this modernization

policy represented by the creation of the Force Nucléaire
Stratégique that is at the heart of this paper.

It was

undertaken not only to revitalize the French military but
to re-direct it into safe channels away from the Revolutionary
Warfare d o c t r i n e . W h i l e

France maintained its empire, there

was a need for a large conventional force.

This force, as

the events of 1958 clearly demonstrated, also posed as a
potential threat to civilian governmental authority.

Al

though the French Empire served as the main justification

^^Elizabeth Stabler, "French Military Policy," Current
History, L, 296 (April, 1966), p. 233.
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for the maintenance of a large field army, France's security
needs because of NATO and the Soviet "threat" also played
an important role.

The loss of its empire did not necessarily

mean the reduction of its military forces and of the domestic
threat that they composed.

The Force Nucléaire Stratégique

was designed to accomplish this task.

By providing a technical

alternative to France's security needs, de Gaulle was able to
reduce the size of the army from the 820,000 men that had
been required while the Algerian problem remained unsolved
to a force of 330,000 men at the time he left office.
These reductions occurred among the conventional combat
forces.
The reduction of the French army (and its conversion to
modernization) did not begin until after 1962.

These reduc

tions did not affect the strength of the Revolutionary War 
fare faction during its struggle with de Gaulle.

They only

occurred after it had been vanquished and were designed
to prevent a future recurrence of a challenge to civilian
authority.

Since most of France's generals had derived

their experiences

(and promotions) from the colonial wars,

the reduction of the size of the army enabled de Gaulle to
remove many of these men who were tainted by the Revolutionary
Warfare d o c t r i n e . C o u p l e d with the reduction of conven-

^^The Statesman's Yearbook, 1958-1970.
^^Furniss, pp. 178-179.
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tional forces this broke up a major center of opposition to
de Gaulle’s policies.
These events occurred after the failure of the Revolu
tionary Warfare faction to destroy the Fifth Republic and
Charles de Gaulle and were designed to protect the govern
ment from future threats.

What enabled de Gaulle to defeat

the Revolutionary Warfare faction in the first place was
his winning over of important elements within the army,
air force, and navy to his modernization policy.

Neither

the air force nor the navy suffered a decline in numerical
strength during de Gaulle’s presidency.

The restructuring

of France’s military security policy around the Force
Nucléaire Stratégique gave a central role to these two
services.

France utilized both surface-to-surface missiles

and sea-to-surface missiles within its nuclear force.

The

navy, air force, and younger army officer with technical
backgrounds achieved new prominence and prestige under de
Gaulle.

These men were engineers, administrators and

technicians more than they were military men.

17

Their

commitment to Charles de Gaulle and the Fifth Republic
foredoomed the Generals’ Revolt in 1961.

The Revolutionary

Warfare faction based in Algeria could not threaten metro
politan France without the service support (transportation.

17

Domenach, p. 193.
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communication, supply, etc.) controlled by the air force
and the navy.

THE CIVIL SERVICE
The role of the civil service throughout the process
was highly invisible.

As the civilian counterpart of the

military, it is possessed with great strength.

Its invis

ibility was perhaps due to the fact that the policies being
followed by de Gaulle were essentially their policies.
It was the civil service that had initiated the French
nuclear program following the disaster of Suez in 1956.
De Gaulle’s endorsement of it helped win them over to the
Fifth Republic.

The civil service had shared the general

distrust and disgust with the Fourth Republic’s le^ system.
The governments of the Fifth Republic were more to its lik
ing because they were composed of men drawn from the civil
service.

An examination of the three offices of premier,

foreign minister, and defense minister

(those concerned with

military security policy) shows that between 1959 and 1969
these offices

were occupied by men with administrative or

civil service backgrounds*^^

Jacques Chaban-Delmas, Michel Debré,

Georges Pompidou, Maurice Couve de Murville, Pierre Messmer
and Pierre Guillaumat all came from technical or administra-

^^The Statesman’s Yearbook, 1958-1970.
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tive careers.

The other ministries, to a lesser extent,

drew upon the civil service to fill their top level posi
tions.

The civil service's role within the Fifth Republic

has obviously been salient, but its congruence with the
policies of Charles de Gaulle makes the necessity for a
lengthy discussion of its activities superfluous.

CHAPTER IV
THE PATTERN OF POLICY
Policy, its formulation and implementation, is the cul
mination of the patterns of government.

Policies emerge

from the play of powers and interests upon the decision
making instruments of the society.

This paper focuses upon

the change in military security policy undertaken during
the years of Charles de Gaulle's presidency.

The institu

tional groups most concerned with the national security
[described in the preceding chapter) were either in agree
ment [e.g., the civil service, the air force, and the navy)
with the creation of the Force Nucléaire Stratégique or else
were thrawted in their opposition [e.g., the Revolutionary
Warfare faction and le^ system) .
the Fifth Republic

With the establishment of

Charles de Gaulle declared the areas of

foreign policy and defense policy were matters exclusively
within the domaine reserve of the French president.^

French

policy became the expression of Charles de Gaulle's beliefs.
Although he was supported quite actively by the civil service
in his endeavors, the principal role in decision-making was
his.

That there was so "little" disagreement over this is

^Anthony Hartley, Gaullism: The Rise and Fall of a Polit
ical M o v eme nt [New York: Outerbridge § Dienstfrey, 1971), p. 196.
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probably due to two factors.

First, de Gaulle provided

stability to the French government.

The civil service

valued this highly because it is essential for the effic
ient administration of the state.

As long as the only

alternative to de Gaulle was chaos and possible civil
war, very few men were reluctant to challenge his authority.
Second, de Gaulle's actions can be said to have been d e 
rived from the deductive premises of his background and
professional training.

Since the deductive process is

dependent upon the initial premises, the civil service
and military reformists differed little from de Gaulle
because he was "one of them."

THE COLD WAR
The Second World War left Europe in shambles.

The

powerless, weakened states of Western Europe were faced
with an ambitious Soviet state.

The Western European

nations lacked the military strength to stop a massive
Soviet attack, but overt aggression was not the only thing
that produced fear in the West.

The Soviet actions through

out Eastern Europe alarmed them to the threats of covert
Soviet pressure.

2

The Atlantic Alliance was created to

John McCloy, The Atlantic Alliance : Its Origin and Its
Future [New York: distributed by Columbia University Press,
Carnegie-Mellon University, 1969), p. 40.
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bolster the Western European states and, if necessary, to
defend them.

It was offered as a visible symbol of the

W e s t ’s determination to remain free.^
Events elsewhere in the world soon began to transform
the Atlantic Alliance.

The Communist invasion of South

Korea resulted in demands for more ’’concrete" measures of
defense to be undertaken by the Atlantic Alliance’s members.
The heightened fear of Soviet aggression made the Atlantic
Alliance’s mutual guarantees appear as an insufficient
deterrent.

In September, 1950, in a protocol to the Atlantic

Alliance the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was estab
lished .^
De Gaulle later described NATO as the symbol of the
American protectorate exercised over Western Europe.^

In

retrospect the terms "protectorate" and "sphere of influ
ence" probably best reflect the reality and flavor of the
Cold War years with regard to Western Europe.

The Western

European states had yet to recover from the effects of the
Second World War.

Their conventional military establishment

William Fox and Annette Fox, NATO and the Range of
American Choice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967),
p . 34.
^Fox and Fox, pp. 14-15.
^France, Ambassade de France, New York, French Foreign
P o l i c y : 1 9 6 6 , "Press Conference Held by Charles de Gaulle
(excerpts), February 21, 1966," p. 20.
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suffered from too great an imbalance vis-à-vis the Soviet
Union to have any hope of stopping a Soviet attack; only
nuclear weapons could do that.^

A Soviet attack on Western

Europe was deterred by the American threat of "massive
retaliation."

This threat in no way eminated from NATO;

America's nuclear forces were all outside of the NATO system.
The United States directly protected Western Europe.

The

role reserved for NATO (besides the symbolism of allied troop
contributions) was that of "controlling" Western Europe;
i.e., for preventing any of the Western European nations
from "triggering" a Soviet-American war.

NATO was the formal

notice of the United States assumption of "responsibility"
for Western Europe analogous to the assumption of respons
ibility for Latin America exercised by the United States in
the late nineteenth century.

THE NUCLEAR QUESTION
As long as the Western European states perceived the
Soviet Union as a threat and the United States as capable
and willing to deter that threat, NATO with its implications
of "protectorate" was accepted by them.

The Soviet Union

was incapable of attacking the United States with either

^Paul Stehlin, "The Evolution of Western Defense,"
Foreign Affairs, XXXXII, 1 (October, 1963), p. 74.
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conventional or nuclear weapons while the United States
could attack the Soviet Union.

This arrangement, which

entailed little risk for the United States, made the A m e r 
ican nuclear guarantee an effective deterrent.

The Western

European states accepted their client-state status in ex
change for the protection afforded them by the United States.
That a real belief in the commonality of their interests
during these years existed does not distract

(although it

does tend to make it more palatable) from this relationship.
The late 1950's saw the American nuclear guarantee
first dissipated and finally broken.
to defend Western Europe

America's willingness

(and the belief in a commonality

of interests) was first challenged by the Suez crisis in
1956.

Great Britain and France undertook the invasion of

Egypt with the assumption that the United States was in
"support" of their action.

When this proved not to be the

case. Great Britain and France found themselves outside the
"perimeter" of American defense.

Although the Soviet Union

possessed a nuclear capability at this time, its delivery
system was not sufficient for it to threaten the United
States.

However, it could rain down nuclear destruction

anywhere in Western Europe.

The Russian role in the Suez

crisis was minimal and secondary at most, but taken in
conjunction with American actions it provides a significant
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premonition of what the future held.

The Soviet Union

blandished the threat of nuclear attack at Great Britain
and France if they did not withdraw from Egypt.

The United

States, also desiring an Anglo-French withdrawal from Egypt,
did not come to the defense of its allies;

it did not counter

the Soviet threat with its own threat of massive retalia7

tion.

The shock occasioned by the knowledge that their

interests could differ so substantially (and result in the
withdrawal of the American nuclear guarantee) served as a
catalyst for the construction of the French Force Nucléaire
Stratégique.^

The French (and British) came to realize that

their interests and American interests were not entirely
identical.

The realization that the American guarantee was

dependent upon French "good behavior" or subservience to
American interests set in motion the events that culminated
in France's nuclear force and in its reassertion of inde
pendence under Charles de Gaulle.
Within a few years of Suez the American guarantee was
broken by the Soviet deployment of a missile delivery
system capable of striking the United States itself.

Suez

demonstrated that the United States could willfully deny

7

1968

Guy de Carmoy, The Foreign Policies of France, 1944(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970) , p. 52.

^Henry Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Co., published for the Council on Foreign
Relations, 1965), pp. 106-107.
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the protection of its nuclear weapons; the Soviet inter
continental strike capability raised the question as to
whether or not the United States could now willfully e x
tend its protection to any other nation.

The vulnerability

of the United States transformed the realities of world
q

politics.

The premises upon which the American nuclear

guarantee had been based were no longer applicable.
De Gaulle’s return to power occurred shortly after
these events had transpired.

Firmly intending upon govern

ing France, he readily perceived that the conditions affect
ing world politics had changed.

These new conditions dic 

tated that France undertake a major reappraisal and readjust
ment of its military security policy.

France’s defense, like

that of the other Western European states, had been based
upon the unconditional, absolute American nuclear guarantee.
This situation no longer existed.

Although France could rely

upon American protection whenever the United States deemed its
own paramount interests at stake, for those instances when
this was not the case some other means had to be found in
order to provide France with the necessary guarantee of
security.

This other means was the Force Nucléaire Stratégique,

The French nuclear force was justified as the replacement

9
Theo Sommer, ”How Many Fingers on How Many Triggers?"
The Atlantic Community Quarterly, I, 4 [Winter, 1963-64),
pp. 556-557r
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for the "failed" American guarantee.

This "failure" of the

American nuclear deterrent was a constant theme presented
by de Gaulle in his statements on France's nuclear program.
But at the same time as the alarms were dying
down, there was also a reduction in the guar
antee of security--one might say absolute-that the possession of the nuclear weapon by
America alone gave to the Old Continent, and
in the certainty that America would employ it,
without reservation, in the event of aggres
sion.
For Soviet Russia has since that time
equipped itself with a nuclear power capable
of striking the United States directly, which
has made the decisions of the Americans as to
the eventual use of th^ir bombs at least
indeterminate . . .
The loss of the American nuclear guarantee was not some
thing which was perceived merely by the supporters of Charles
de Gaulle.

The realization of this occurrence permeated the

entire French "elite."

Rene Pleven, who had been one of the

Fourth Republic’s premiers, is an example of the pervasiveness
of this understanding

(Pleven, it should be noted,

later

held office within the Gaullist ministries); he wrote early
in de Gaulle’s presidency that:
Some of those who realized the gravity of the
threat which the Soviets now held over the free
world began to wonder if there was not a risk
that the guarantee of nuclear intervention
hitherto so generously offered by the United

France, Ambassade de France, New York, French Foreign
Policy : 1 9 6 6 , "Press Conference Held by Charles de Gaulle
(excerpts), February 21, 1966," p. 20.
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States to all the free peoples might not
one day be limited to the stakes which the
American public considered most essential
to its own security.11
De Gaulle was not faced with the task of convincing the French
that they were indeed faced with a security problem; this
already widely accepted.

was

By the time he returned to power,

the argument had devolved from the stage of definition to
that of seeking out a possible solution.

The Force Nucléaire

Stratégique was offered as a solution to a recognized and
well understood problem.
De Gaulle adopted the nuclear program as the best means
by which to address France's military security problem.

Con 

sequently he accelerated the development of France’s nuclear
weapons program.

12

His actions,when taken in conjunction with

the subsequent withdrawal of France from NATO,have often been
described as rash and inappropriate.

A careful examination

of the situation reveals that this is not the case.

De Gaulle,

through his li f e ’s work, had demonstrated his loyalty to France
and its security.

His early career had been that of a ’’mi l i 

tary intellectual" devoted to the study of military strategy.
Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville in a speech before
the National Assembly enunciated on this reputation.

He said:

^^René Pleven, "France in the Atlantic Community,"
Foreign A ffai r s, XXXVIII, 1 [October, 1959), p. 25.
l^Hartley, p. 197.
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. . . everyone is well aware, consciously or
unconsciously, that the quarrel is not m i l i 
tary, but political.
The best proof of this
is that no one, either in France or abroad,
has sincerely felt that our Government, in
doing what it has just decided, was endanger
ing its own defense or that of its allies.
Who, moreover, would imagine that General
de Gaulle himself would at any time assume
responsibility for anything that would be
likely to jeopardize the nation's security?
The political nature of this question is more evident when
the military considerations are analyzed.
French security is ultimately guaranteed by the United
States.

The strategic importance of France is such that it

would benefit from the protection afforded the United States
to its other European allies.

The loss of France due to

aggression (not as the result of retaliation for actions it
had taken elsewhere) would not be in the national interests
of the United States.

In such a case (unprovoked aggression)

the United States would, regardless of treaty delegations, be
forced to protect F r a n c e . T h e

Force Nucléaire Stratégique *s

function was to fill the gap between American interests and
French interests.

The nuclear striking force's purpose was

to guarantee France the ability to pursue an active policy
without the fear of "nuclear blackmail."

13

It was the memory

France, Ambassade de France, New York, French Foreign
Policy: 1966, "Speech by M. Couve de Murville before the
National Assembly: April 14, 1966," p. 51.
^^Kissinger, p. 17.
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of Suez and not of the Fall of France which provided the
motivation behind France's nuclear program.
The French military security policy is defensively
orientated; with the liquidation of its empire this has
become even more so.
in this century alone.
tion upon France.

France has suffered two great invasions
The World Wars wrecked great destruc

The desire for military security is aimed

primarily at preserving France from yet another invasion.
The post-World War II era introduced the threat of nuclear
"invasion" to the fears that play upon the minds of French
statesmen.

The American nuclear guarantee,while it had

been operative, had protected France from the threat of
invasion.

It was this security that was sought in seeking

a replacement for the no longer operative American guarantee.
Premier Georges Pompidou said that:
Our basic effort is the deterrent force, b e 
cause we consider that above all we must save
peace, our peace, and not be attacked.
The
only way not to be attacked is to have a suf
ficiently powerful atomic arsenal; the day we
have a sufficient atomic arsenal, including
the hydrogen bomb, well, France will never be.g
attacked again.
This is what is fundamental.
Defense was the primary military function envisioned for the

15

France, Ambassade de France, New York, French Foreign
Policy : 1 9 6 6 , "Televised Interview of M. Pompidou [excerpts]:
September 26^, 1966," p. 117.
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Force Nucléaire Stratégique.

It would prevent France from

being "sold out" in a confrontation between the superpowers
by giving it something to "bargain" with.
The Force Nucléaire Stratégique also served a number
of non-defensive interests.

Its use to convert the army

away from the Revolutionary Warfare doctrine has already
been described in the preceding chapter.

Another important

aspect that de Gaulle felt could be derived from the nuclear
program was the stimulation of the French economy from
scientific "spin-offs."

The modern technology ancillary

to a nuclear weapons program (communications, computer
systems, etc.) is adaptable to the needs of civilian indus
tries.

It was also associated with France's mystique of

glory and honor.

The possession of nuclear weapons was

viewed as a symbol of Great Power status; a status de Gaulle
felt that France rightfully possessed.
. . . a French atomic deterrent force is
coming into existence and is going to grow
continuously.
It is a relatively modest
force, it is true, but one which is chang
ing and will completely change, the condi
tions of our own defense, those of our
intervention in faraway lands and those
of the contribution that we would be able
to make to the safeguard of our a l l i e s .

France, French Embassy, New York, M a jor Addresses,
Statements and Press Conferehces of Genera1 CharTes de Gaulie
May 19, 19S F ^ a h U a r y 51, 1 5 6 4 , "Sixth Press Conference held
by General de Gaulle as President of the French Republic in
Paris at the Elysee Palace on May 15, 1962," p. 180.
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These subsidiary reasons added depth to the Force Nucléaire
Stratégique *s military purpose.
An important military question was whether or not
France was capable of constructing a credible deterrent
force.

The effectiveness of a deterrent is an unmeasure-

able quality for it is unknown when not used and a failure
when it has to be.

It was readily admitted that a force

similar in scope to that of either the United States or the
Soviet Union was beyond the economic capabilities of France,
but such a force was not required in order to provide France
with a credible deterrent.

France did not require the arsenal

of a superpower; the adopting of a "porcupine strategy" ade
quately satisfied its needs.

The porcupine is a small, weak,

slow animal that could easily be overwhelmed by any of a
number of much larger predators, but the porcupine is able
to deter its potential predators.

The porcupine's quills

protect it from being eaten not because they represent a
superior strength but because they make the effort too
"costly."

It was this strategy that France adopted.

Defense

Minister Michel Debre enunciated this view in explaining why
France did not need to achieve parity with the superpowers.
For it is clear that to deter a would-be
aggressor does not require parity of nuclear
armament, but simply the ability to bring
to bear on him a threat proportionate to the
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importance he attaches to the desired
conquest.17
Whenever French and American interests coincided, France
could be assured of the support of the United States nuclear
might.

When their interests differed, the Force Nucléaire

Stratégique could protect France.

THE WITHDRAWAL FROM NATO
The establishment of the strategic nuclear force and
the French withdrawal from the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza
tion were directly related.

By the 1960’s the conditions that

had given rise to NATO had underwent substantial changes.

The

call for reform was not limited only to the French Government
of Charles de Gaulle.

The recovery of the European states in

the 1950's lead them to advocate reforms that would adequately
reflect within NATO their new strength.

While any French

government would have pressed for these reforms, only de
Gaulle would have proposed withdrawal as an alternative if
the reforms were not acceded to.

18

De Gaulle’s policies were motivated by a mystical,
nationalism that exalted France's glory and its historic
role as a Great Power.

NATO was viewed as the symbol and

^^Michel Debré, "France's Global Strategy," Foreign
A ffairs, XXXXIX, 3 (April, 1971), pp. 398-399.

18

John Newhouse, De Gaulle and the Anglo-Saxons
York: Viking Press, 19717) , p . 47.

(New
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instrument of the American protectorate over Western Europe.
Its unreformed existence was anathema to Charles de Gaulle
who viewed the role of protectorate as an impediment to
French independence.

The conditions of the 1 9 5 0 's had been

such that it had been necessary for France to accept this
subservience; the 196 0's were different.

In reviewing the

policies of those years Premier Georges Pompidou stated:
"You know that our action over the past nine years has been
aimed at restoring the independence of our policy.

Today

this independence is acquiesced.
One of the main motivations behind the French withdrawal
from NATO was this desire to re-assert France’s independence.
NATO, because of its American domination, was viewed as an
obstacle to this goal.

Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de

Murville spoke of this relationship between defense and
independence.

He said:

. . . its disadvantages are that first it
strips us French--whether the Government or
the citizens are concerned--of the feeling
of our responsibilities in defense matters
and, consequently, to a very large degree,
of the will to defend ourselves.
Defense
has become a somewhat anonymous thing in
which we do not feel we are truly partici
pating.
And as soon as a country is no

France, Ambassade de France, New York, French Foreign
Policy: January-June, 1967, "Governmental Statement by Mr.
Pompidou Before the National Assembly: April 18, 1967,"
p . 54.
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longer interested in its defense, it is not
far--it must be said--from losing its inde
pendence .20
Independence carried with it the connotations of societal
integrity and cultural heritage.

The threat to French inde

pendence posed by the lack of interest in defense did not
merely endanger a state but the entire essence of nation
ality.
That France’s actions represented a positive concern
with its own problems and not an attempt to disparage the
United States is evident by the distinction that was made
between NATO and the Atlantic Alliance per s e .

Although

American officials tended to perceive these as the same
thing, the French associated the Atlantic Alliance with
Western interests and NATO with American interests.

De

Gaulle never contemplated withdrawing from the Atlantic
Alliance; he intended upon honoring France’s commitments
to i t .
The Atlantic Alliance exists.
So long as
the Soviets threaten the world, this alli
ance must be maintained.
France is an
integral part of it.
If the free world
were attacked, or the old or the new con
tinent, France would take part in the
common defense of the coasts of her allies

20

France, Ambassade de France, New York, French Foreign
Policy: 1966, "Interview by M. Couve de Murville to the ORTF
March 17, 1966," p. 28.
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and with all the means that she has.

21

That this commitment implied a more "active" role than the
United States anticipated for its "client" states is the
origin of the Franco-American dispute that eventually lead
de Gaulle to withdraw France from NATO.

The Force Nucléaire

Stratégique was the means chosen by de Gaulle to achieve this
aim.
. . . within the Atlantic Alliance--indispensible so long as the ambitions and the
threats of the Soviets are raised--our
country, while combining its defense with
that of its allies, intends to remain the
master and, if necessary, contribute to
the common effort something quite different
from the soulless and powerless assistance
of a people that would no longer be respon
sible for themselves.
This leads us to
provide ourselves with the modern means
of ensuring our security, in other words,
with the means for deterring any country
whatsoever from attacking ours, at the risk
of subjecting itself to frightful destruc
tion.
I mean, of course, atomic w e a p o n s . 22
These actions were not designed to weaken the Atlantic
Alliance but, in a sense, to strengthen it.

There was, how

ever, an intention upon weakening American control over
2lFrance, French Embassy, New York, Ma j or Addresses,
Statements and Press Conferences of General Charles de Gaulle :
May 19, 1958-January 51, 1964, "Sixth Press Conference Held by
General de Gaulle as President of the French Republic in Paris
at the Elysee Palace on May 15, 1962," p. 179.
?2
France, French Embassy, New York, Major Addresses,
Statements and Press Conferences of General Charles de Gaulle:
May 19, 1958-January 51, 1964, "Address by President Charles de
Gaulle on the Economy European Policy, The Atlantic Alliance
Broadcast over ORTF on April 19, 1963," p. 25.

70

Western Europe and France in particular.

The actual steps

taken in the withdrawal were structured such that no real
military damage was done to the Atlantic Alliance.

Although

France "officially" withdrew from NATO on March 7, 1966, it
had been slowly withdrawing the forces that it had committed
to the NATO commands ever since March 7, 1959 (when it w i t h 
drew its Mediterranean naval units).

By spreading out its

withdrawal over a number of years, de Gaulle gave his allies
time to readjust their military postures.
By the 1960's the Soviet threat was perceived as dimin
ishing.

This factor was fundamental in explaining why de

Gaulle was able and willing to cut France's ties with NATO.
NATO had been accepted by France originally because of the
Soviet military threat.

As that threat lessened so did

the justification for NATO.

Other changes also affected

the relationship of the European states vis-à-vis the United
States.

As Europe recovered in the post-World War II world,

it focused its attention to its own problems.
from their empires

(sometimes by violence), the European

states no longer had true global interests.
United States did.

Separated

However, the

The United States involvement in world

affairs brought it into "conflict" with the Soviet Union.
These conflicts, because of Europe's treaty commitments^ made
it subject to threats of war over matters that it had no
concern for.

The reform movement, lead by France, desired
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to change NATO in order to minimize the chances of the United
States leading them into an unwanted war.
Western defense was dependent upon nuclear weapons.
NATO, without any nuclear forces within its command struc
ture, was not in the mainstream.

As the American guarantee

weakened, NATO proved inadequate to cope with the problem.
NATO strategy was unilaterally decided by the United States;
the European "allies" were expected to comply.

The European

states did not possess a voice in the making of decisions.

23

As long as the United States had been invulnerable and its
nuclear protection could be "relied" upon, this relationship
gave rise to little concern.

When, in the 196 0's, this was

no longer the case, this became a matter of contention
between the United States and its Western European allies.
Now that the United States was vulnerable to attack itself,
the European states were afraid the United States might,
under the threat of nuclear retaliation, abandon them.
However, it was felt that if these states shared in the con
trol of nuclear weapons this abandonment would not occur.
It was for this reason that the European states wanted a
voice in the critical decisions that affected them.^^

^^Kissinger, pp. 94-95.
^^Robert Schaetzel, speech at the Ditchley Foundation,
Oxfordshire, England, September 27, 1963, printed in The
Atlantic Community Quarterly, I, 4 (Winter, 1963-64), p. 566
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The United States opposed any changes
system) along this line.

(through the NATO

It did not want other nations

having a voice in its fate.

Decisions that were critical

to the United States were deemed as inappropriate for other,
25
less "responsible" states to have a voice in.
These were
the same fears that motivated the European states in their
demands for a greater role within NATO.

The United States

unwillingness to accord to the European states the same
protection that it demanded for itself further damaged the
credibility of its nuclear guarantee
serious questioning).

(already under

France,unable to achieve reforms

within NATO, opted for an "independent" status similar to
that claimed by the United States.
The NATO structure gave the United States practical
control over the forces committed to it.

This condition

met with strenuous opposition on the part of French mi li 
tary leaders.

Army Chief of Staff Charles Ailleref expressed

the essence of this situation when he said:
The defense of France was therefore in effect
to be entrusted entirely to the United States
and French forces were liable to be brought
into action on the decision of American gen
erals and not that of French leaders acting
in accordance with directives from our gov-

25

George Ball, address to the Princeton National Alumni
Association (Woodrow Wilson Fiftieth Anniversary Group),
Washington, D.C., April 26, 1963, printed in The Atlantic
Community Quarterly, I, 2 (Summer, 1963), pp. 200-201.
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* 26
ernment.
De Gaulle took issue with this organizational structure from
the moment he returned to power in France.

In accelerating

the development of the force de frappe he realized that there
would be demands for its integration within the NATO command
structure.

The French desired to be allies and not a de 

pendent client state.

A speech by Premier Pompidou before

the National Assembly voiced France's intention of retaining
control of its own destiny.
We refuse, it is true, to allow our armed
forces, and especially our deterrent force,
to be lost in an organization which neces
sarily results in stripping us of any
decision-making power of our own.
But it
is not necessary for us to give up our
existence in order to be a good ally, it
is doubtless just the opposite.27
It was the inability to reform this arrangement that neces
sitated France's withdrawal from NATO under de Gaulle.
The affect that the NATO structure had upon the conven
tional forces of France was itself sufficient cause for de
Gaulle to contemplate withdrawal;

the affect that it would

have on the Force Nucléaire Stratégique made withdrawal

^^Charles Ailleret, lecture given before the NATO De
fense College, printed in The Atlantic Community Quarterly,
II, 3 (Fall, 1964), p. 19.
27Ceorge5 Pompidou, Foreign Policy Statement before the
French National Assembly, June 17, 1965, printed in The
Atlantic Community Quarterly, III, 3 (Fall, 1965), pp. 328-329,
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necessary.

In his Memoirs of Hope de Gaulle expressed this

opinion in the following passage:
Hence, while continuing to belong to the
alliance formed by the Treaty of Washington
for mutual assistance in case of aggression,
she planned to leave NATO sooner or later,
the more so as she intended to equip herself
with nuclear weapons which there could be no
question of integrating into the system.
More
than anything else, political independence
commensurate with my country's position and
aims was essential to its survival in the
future.28
De Gaulle's beliefs slowly gained wider and wider acceptance
among the French leaders as his contentions were time and
time again proved true.
Immediately upon assuming office de Gaulle set out to
demonstrate that the United States would never allow NATO
to undergo any meaningful reform.

The "Tri-Directorate

Proposal," the subject of a secret memorandum sent to Great
Britain and the United States in September, 1958, posited
that the three powers jointly control the West's nuclear
arsenal

(and the formulation of policy).

De Gaulle in his

Memoirs of Hope discussed the rationale behind this gambit.
France's accession to this summit would be
all the more appropriate because the Western
monopoly of atomic weapons would very soon

28

Charles de Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope : Renewal and E n 
deavor (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971), p. 178.
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cease to belong exclusively to the AngloSaxons, now that we were about to acquire
them.
I therefore proposed that the alliance
should henceforth be placed under a triple
rather than a dual direction, failing which
France would take no further part in NATO
developments and would reserve the right,
under Article 12 of the treaty which had
inaugurated the system, either to demand
its reform or to leave it.
As I expected,
the two recipients of my memorandum replied
evasively.
So there was nothing to prevent
us from taking a c t i o n . 2 9

De Gaulle had been convinced that the United States

(and its

junior partner. Great Britain) would not take up his offer
because it entailed a loss of independence and flexibility.
The tri-directorate proposal had been designed "to put its
recipients in the wrong in the eyes of French opinion," and
this is precisely what it did.

30

Because it had been in

cluded in a secret memorandum, the French were aware only
of the Anglo-American refusals and not of the nature of
the "reforms" that de Gaulle had proposed.

The tri-directorate

proposal ended any thoughts within the French Government about
integrating the striking force into the NATO structure.

Within

NATO the Force Nucléaire Stratégique would have been removed
from French control.
Events over the next few years tended to re-enforce these
impressions of America.

The activities that transpired during

Z^De Gaulle, pp. 202-203.
30

Hartley, p.

211.
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the Kennedy Administration were the most flagrant afronts
to French sensibilities.

Under the Kennedy Administration

the United States unilaterally abandoned the policy of m a s 
sive retaliation for one of "flexible response."

Flexible

response represented precisely the fear that had motivated
the European states into demanding a voice in NATO policy.
The flexible response doctrine removed the threat of re 
taliation from the barricades thrown up to defend Western
Europe against the Soviet Union.

Premier Pompidou challenged

this turn of events before the National Assembly.
Within NATO itself, we have seen the replace
ment, gradual and without our agreement, of
the initial strategy that was based on de 
terrence and, consequently, on the immediate
use of atomic reprisals, by a strategy called
"flexible" which, under the pretext of lessen
ing the risk of total war, actually consists
in enabling the United States to limit the
field of the initial operations by sparing
,1
the territory of the main potential aggressor.
Flexible response was the abandonment of Western Europe by
the United States.

It was designed to spare American soil

from nuclear holocaust but at the cost of Western Europe.
The Cuban Missile Crisis gave the fears that had been
roaming around Europe reality.

31

Although the actions taken

France, Ambassade de France, New York, French Foreign
Policy: 1966, "Statement by M. Georges Pompidou Before the
National Assembly and the Senate (excerpts): April 13, 1966,"
p . 46.
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by President Kennedy were unilateral, there was little if
any disagreement over their appropriateness.

The lesson

of October was that the United States, because of interests
(and adventures) for which Western Europe had no concern,
could bring them all to the brink of war.

As the dif

ferences between American and European interests increased,
this fear of unwanted war grew.

De Gaulle cited this as a

salient determinant in France's decision to withdraw from
NATO.
. . . while the prospects of a world war break
ing out on account of Europe are dissipating,
conflicts in which America engages in other
parts of the world--as the day before yester
day in Korea, yesterday in Cuba, today in
Vietnam--risk, by virtue of that famous esca
lation, being extended so that the result could
be a general conflagration.
In that case Europe-who's strategy is, within NATO, that of America-would be automatically involved in the struggle,
even when it would not have so desired.32
This fear prompted de Gaulle to "hurriedly" separate France
from NATO and the hegemony of American policy.
Throughout this period the United States engaged in a
constant effort to have the French striking force integrated
into NATO.

This would have meant that the United States

would exercise control over it; since there was no reciprocity

32

France, Ambassade de France, New York, French Foreign
Policy : 1 9 6 6 , "Press Conference Held by Charles de Gaulle
(excerpts): February 21, 1966," p. 20.
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to these proposals

(i.e., the United States was unwilling

to lose total control over its own nuclear forces) de Gaulle
opposed them.

To have done otherwise would have forfeited

the security obtained by their own nuclear deterrent.

Be 

cause NATO was so controlled by the United States, any
nuclear forces within it would have been subject to the
same disadvantages inherent in the American force; i.e.,
the fear of the United States sacrificing Europe would have
still existed.

Since this is what the force de frappe had

been created to remedy, integration was totally out of the
question.
The tri-dictorate proposal had demonstrated that the
United States would not consent to having its own forces
merged into any integrated command.
national proposals

The various multi

(disguised as "integrated commands")

that were offered by the United States in the early 1960's
all entailed, ultimately, American control of all nuclear
weapons--its own which were not to be "integrated" and those
of its allies which were.
Stopgap plans for sharing our nuclear we a p
onry- -multi- lateral , multi-national, inter
allied mixed crews, or whatever name--turn
out to be form without substance.
Each has
a built in trigger guard, some gimmick to
make certain that ultimate control remains
in our h a n d s . 33

33Richard Nixon, Excerpts from an address to the American
Society of Newspaper Editors, April 20, 1963, published in
The Atlantic Community Quarterly, I, 2 (Summer, 1963), p. 205.
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Not only were those schemes designed to leave the United
States in control of its own missiles but to gain control
of those of its allies--particularly the French force.
Premier Pompidou outlined the differences that were the
intended result of the American schemes.
If the President of the United States considers
that nuclear forces must be engaged, he has
95 per cent of the American atomic weapons
at his disposal for that and does not need
to ask anyone's advice.
What good would it
be for the European nations to be able, in
theory, to veto the engagement of the remain
ing 5 per cent?
If on the contrary, the
American President refuses, against the advice
of the European nations to engage the nuclear
forces, his veto is enough to paralyze every
thing.
Who can therefore dispute that our
deterrent force, modest but real, would lose
all but the semblance of meaning if it were
"integrated"?34

By avoiding the dangers inherently associated with integra
tion, France hoped to re-assert its independence.

^^Pompidou, p. 328.

CHAPTER V
CONSEQUENCES
Politics do not occur in a vacuum.

The creation of

the Force Nucléaire Stratégique was affected by the milieu
of French politics.

In the Beer-Ulam approach the creation

of a new policy sets into motion the agents of change that
begin the patterns of government process anew.

The three

sections of this chapter examine the advantages to France
of its independent nuclear force, its disadvantages, and
what the "future" holds in store for the Force Nucléaire
Stratégique.

THE POLICY OF TRADITION
The Force Nucléaire Stratégique is accepted as the
optimum defense policy by those who hold power in France.
It was the expression and instrument of France’s drive
under de Gaulle to reassert its independence.

Although

de Gaulle's personality and style cannot be discounted,
it cannot be overlooked that he pursued a policy rooted
in France’s tradition.

Be Gaulle desired to re-assert

France’s role of independence in world affairs.^

^Roy Macridis

His

(ed.). Modern European Governments :
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policy was also concerned with France's perennial search
2
for security.
These two objectives have been traditional
elements of French policy.

The major thrust of the Force

Nucléaire Stratégique was to provide France with the cap
abilities to pursue other, more specific policies.

As such

it is apolitical; the nuclear force can serve the purposes
of any French government.

This flexibility provides it

with an advantage that would mititate against any drastic
changes.

The economic considerations

(sunk costs, alter

nate program funding, etc.) are dealt with in the following
section.

It should be noted, however, that any change in

France's military security policy (which would entail an
alternative program and not merely the cessation of any
program) would be extremely costly.
The question of France's relations with NATO are p e r 
haps more perplexing.

Although de Gaulle's withdrawal of

France from NATO appears drastic when compared with the
policies of the Fourth Republic, an examination of larger
scope reveals that it was the Fourth Republic's actions
which were drastic.

The Fourth Republic had been too weak

following World War II to re-assert France's independence;

Cases in Comparative Policy Making (Englewood Cliffs, New
Jersey: Prentice-HalT^ 196 8) , p. 101.
2

Elizabeth Stabler, "French Military Policy," Current
History, L, 296 (April, 1966), p. 232.
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it had to settle for the "abnormal" protectorate relation3
ship offered by NATO in order to secure France’s borders.
When France recovered its strength, it was able, under de
Gaulle, to throw off the NATO "yoke."
It is important to remember the differences that de
Gaulle saw between the Atlantic Alliance and NATO.

An alli

ance composed of "co-equal" member states was never objected
to; it was only to the organizational structure that trans
formed the European states into clients that de Gaulle
objected to.

The Pompidou government has cooperated with

the European NATO members under a number of circumstances.
As far as French readmittance to NATO is concerned, this
would be dependent upon its reform (essentially involving
the end of American control).
De Gaulle wanted to restore France to its "rightful"
role in the world.

Although specific policies in the realm

of international relations are beyond the scope of this
paper,

it should be noted that the nuclear force

France the capabilities, real and psychological,

(in giving
to maintain

its independence) has enabled France to pursue a more
activist role in world affairs.

The prestige associated

with the possession of nuclear weapons has given France a
greater voice in the arena of nations.

3

Its policy of

Simon Serfaty, France, De Gaulle and Europe : The Policy
of the Fourth and Fifth Republics Toward the Continent (Balti
more: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 118.
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independence vis-à-vis both the United States and the Soviet
Union has served as a rallying point forthose
not in agreement with

Western nations

the superpowers.

MATERIAL SECURITY
The nation de Gaulle inherited in 1958 was well on its
way to economic recovery.

The immobilism of the Fourth R e 

public tended to hide

this development.

It is an important

occurrence in that de

Gaulle would not have been able to

construct the costly Force Nucléaire Stratégique otherwise.^
The initial costs necessary for a nuclear program are so
horrendous that unless a nation is "prosperous” it cannot
afford to undertake such a project without totally endanger
ing its economy.

De Gaulle was able to meet these costs

both through France’s economic growth and the transference
of funds from other programs

(the NATO commitment and the

500,000-man reduction within the army).

But the nuclear

force did suffer setbacks due to economic factors.^
With the expansion of the French economy the workers
and other lower class groups expected to share in the new
prosperity.

As their expectations failed to be met, they

became more and more dissatisfied with France’s domestic
^Cecil Crabb, "The Gaullist Revolt Against the AngloSaxons," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science, 351, 4 (January, 1964), pp. 20-21.
^Guy de Carmoy, "France and the Atlantic Community,"
Current History, LVIII, 345 (May, 1970), p. 269.
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policy until they erupted in the "Spirit of May."

The riots

and strikes carried on by the students and workers in May,
1968, forced the government of Charles de Gaulle to pay more
attention to the growing social welfare demands of the French
people.

The money to fulfill these demands was drawn, in part,

from the defense budget.

Although the modernization of the

military was not halted, it was delayed and in some instances
forced to modify its plans

(for instance, mechanized, armour

divisions ceased to be mentioned).^

These delays in the

nuclear force were eventually made up and the program com
pleted.^

The costs that affect the Force Nucléaire Stratégique

are now mainly those of upkeep.

For this reason it is unlikely

that any French government would scrap it and start from
scratch building another defense apparatus, especially since
the credibility

(effectiveness) of the nuclear force has not

been questioned.

CONCLUSIONS
The question of après de Gaulle intrigued

the scholars

of the Fifth Republic throughout de Gaulle's presidency.
That the presidential system of the Fifth Republic functioned

^Guy de Carmoy, "The Last Year of De Gaulle's Foreign
Policy," International Affairs, XXXV, 3 (July, 1969), pp.
425-426.
7
Edward Kolodziej, "French Mediterranean Policy: The
Politics of Weakness," International Affairs, XXXVII, 3
(July, 1971), p. 504.
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with de Gaulle was no proof that it would under the leader
ship of a "lesser" man.
its presidency,

With the removal of de Gaulle from

it was posited that the Fifth Republic

would experience an entropy of power.

To some extent this

redistribution has occurred under President Pompidou, but
he, although stylistically different from de Gaulle, has
been able to provide the presidency with another strong
leader.
The Pompidou presidency has been Gaullist in spirit
and fact.

It was under President Pompidou that the Force

Nucléaire Stratégique's deployment was completed.

The

costs of this, although delayed by the need to meet France's
social welfare demands, were met.

The immediate post-de

Gaulle years have been a continuation of de Gaulle's
policies

(although the loss of de Gaulle has greatly

affected the unity and direction of the Gaullists).

This

is not too startling when one compares the governments under
President Pompidou with those under de Gaulle.

The key p e r 

sonnel in both are the same; Pompidou, Chaban-Delmas,
Messmer and Debre were all ministers under de Gaulle
(Chaban-Delmas was President of the National Assembly).
These men had supported de Gaulle in his modernization
policy and after 1969 continued to support that policy.
A change has and is occurring with regard to the
nature of the post-de Gaulle governments.

Whereas de Gaulle

86

relied heavily upon administrative personnel. President
Pompidou (for the years 1969-1973) has used fewer civil
O

servants in his cabinets.

The number of elected officials

within the governments has markedly increased since de
Gaulle left office in April, 1969.

Although it is too early

to predict anything with a great degree of accuracy, this
trend "bodes ill" for the Fifth Republic.

A perennial ques

tion in French politics has been ministerial responsibility;
is the government responsible to the head of state or to the
legislature?

It has been on this question that France’s

previous attempts at presidentialism have foundered.

The

Fifth Republic will eventually have to face and answer this
question.
It is unlikely that the Gaullists would endeavor to
change France’s military security policy (as long as it
fulfilled its function).

Not only were they instrumental

in completing the Force Nucléaire Stratégique but the costs
that a new program would entail militate against such a
course of action (unless, of course, it was deemed absolutely
necessary because of obsolescence).

An examination of the

most likely "alternative" to Gaullist leadership leads to
the same conclusion.

The Socialist-Communist coalition

that proved a viable contender in the March, 1973 legisla-

^The Statesman’s Yearbook, 1958-1973.
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tive elections is mainly concerned with meeting the social
welfare demands of the workers and other lower class groups.
They would be less likely to favor the funding of a new
system than the Gaullists.

With regard to foreign affairs,

Francois Mitterand,

the coalition's "leader," foresaw "no
9
objective change" if they were to come to power.
The Force Nucleaire Stratégique represents a return
to France's traditional policy of independence.

It was

designed to meet the security needs left exposed by the
failure of the American nuclear guarantee and, as long as
it does this, it will continue to be supported.

The p o s 

session of nuclear weapons provides France with the flex
ibility (derived from the security of deterrence) to pursue
other policies on a global scale.

Of course, a government

that reputiated this role would not need a nuclear force
but in a nation that is ever so conscious of its prestige
and historic role this is unlikely.

The civil service and

the military have become "attached" to the nuclear program
as a guarantee of France's independence.

This symbolic

attachment is also prevalent among the general population
which,with France's tradition of insecurity, makes the
nuclear force a valuable bulwark to the government.

^"Approaching a Crucial Vote," Tim e, March 5, 1973, p. 22
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